In this paper we model the determinants of firm level wages and employment explicitly allowing for firm and worker heterogeneity. Our firms have three types of workers (cadres, skilled and unskilled) and may explicitly choose from among three distinct contracting regimes (strong form efficiency, labor demand/right to manage, and incentive contracting). We apply the model to a representative sample of 1,097 French enterprises for the period 1978 to 1987. We find that firms with enterprise level agreements appear to implement incentive contracts. This is significant because in France a firm level agreement is voluntary. On the other hand, firms without accords appear to operate on their labor demand curves. That is, they make labor demand decisions using the sector level agreement as the relevant wage rate. Efficient contracts are dominated by the other two contractual possibilities. External wage rates, which we estimate for each group of workers within each firm, appear not to influence employment decisions in the manner predicted by efficient contracts regardless of the accord status of the firm. Par contre, les firmes sans accord d'entreprise semblent utiliser le salaire de la convention de branche et déterminent ainsi leur demande de travailleurs. Les contrats efficaces sont dominés par les deux autres possibilités. Les salaires du marché externe que nous avons estimés pour chaque niveau de qualification n'interviennent pas dans la détermination des effectifs; ce résultat contredit donc un modèle de contrat efficace.
Introduction
Throughout the 1980s economists from several countries tried to apply explicit models of contracting to explain wage and employment patterns in firms with unionized workforces. The explicit form of these models has always been derived from basic cooperative/noncooperative bargaining frameworks. In the United States, for example, these models consider the arrangements that give rise to firm-level negotiations; that is, the models explain firm-level employment and negotiated wages using external wage rates, product market conditions, and firm-specific performance measures. 1 The public nature of collective bargaining agreements and company-level financial information, which is a peculiarity of American industrial relations, has permitted micro-economic analysis of those firms with unions. There are no comparable American data for nonunion firms. In Canada, the institutional arrangements are sufficiently similar to the U.S. that equivalent studies have also been attempted with unionized Canadian firms. Recently, studies have appeared using firm-level data in Great Britain that take a comparable approach to wage and employment determination.
All of the models of which we are aware share two common features. First, the researchers have tried to determine which kind of bargaining/negotiation model best describes the wage settlements and employment outcomes in a sample of firms. Thus, the heterogeneity among the firms never gives rise to multiple contracting environments in the estimated models. Second, all workers within a firm are taken to be homogeneous. Thus, the skill composition of the workforce is not allowed to influence the statistically-selected "preferred model." To be sure, both of these characteristics arise more from problems in the data than from the researchers' prior constraints.
Finally, all of the micro-economic analyses mentioned above share a common, and deliberate, modelling decision--the firm never voluntarily chooses to pay more than the negotiated wage rate.
In the United States this possibility does not arise in conventional models of collective bargaining, although it is an important element of theories of nonunion wage structures. In contrast, European modelers have treated the problem of "wage drift," which is defined as paying more than the sector-level collective bargaining agreement requires. 2 Wage drift has generally been studied using only macroeconomic data; however, in Great Britain Nickell and Wadhwani (1991) allow an efficiency wage model among the various microeconomic models of employment and wage determination they study.
In this paper we consider firm and worker heterogeneity directly. Our firms have three types of workers (cadres, skilled and unskilled) and may explicitly choose from among three distinct contracting regimes (strong form efficiency, labor demand/right to manage, and incentive contracting). We apply the model to a representative sample of 1,097 French enterprises for the period 1978 to 1987. We find that firms with enterprise level agreements appear to implement incentive contracts. This is significant because in France a firm level agreement is voluntary. On the other hand, firms without accords appear to operate on their labor demand curves, using the sector-level wage rate as the relevant price of labor. That is, they take the sector level agreement as given. Efficient contracts are dominated by the other two possibilities. External wage rates, which we estimate for each group of workers within each firm, appear not to influence employment decisions regardless of the accord status of the firm.
Section 2 describes the three basic models we use for salary and employment determination.
Section 3 describes our data sources and methods. Section 4 presents the estimation results. We conclude in section 5.
Efficient Contracting, Labor Demand and Incentive Models
We begin by adopting a standard notation for describing the salary and employment decision-making processes at the enterprise level.
Definitions xt 1 ≡ opportunity costs of time for J skill groups in year t (Jx1), wt 2 ≡ internal salaries for J skill groups in year t (Jx1), Ωt 10 ≡ information set available at time t, ) , x V( t t Ω 11 ≡ total quasi-rents, revenue net of material costs and opportunity costs from employment Lt 12 given information Ωt 13, γ t 14 ≡ proportion of the quasi-rent per worker that goes to employees in each of the J skill groups during year t (Jx1).
The Efficient Contracting Model (EC)
In an efficient contract (strong form, see Brown and Ashenfelter 1986 ) the total quasi-rent is maximized over the choice of employment levels given the current information available to the parties. Thus, the employment levels are determined by the solution to the problem:
The labor demands are functions of the external salaries and the information set, which solve
The wage settlements can be expressed directly as a function of the maximized quasi-rent per worker:
Alternatively, the wage settlements can be re-expressed in terms of the value-added per worker:
Either equation (3) or (4) may be used to define the quasi-rent splitting γ 0 jt 19's; however, neither the labor demand equations (2) nor the maximized quasi-rent from (1) depend upon these parameters.
On the other hand, since we have not specified the game played to determine γ 0 jt 20, it is possible that both employment and total quasi-rents affect the equilibrium values of these parameters.
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The Labor Demand/Right to Manage Model (LD)
In the labor demand model (formally equivalent to the right to manage in this static framework) the wage settlement is specified as w * jt 21. Given this wage settlement, the firm unilaterally maximizes its profit level to determine the demand for each skill group. The demand equations solve:
The labor demand equations are:
Without loss of generality, we can use the same definition of the rent splitting parameters, γ * jt 24, as was used for the efficient contract. That is, we can define the wage settlement as the external salary x jt 25 plus some proportion γ * jt 26 of the theoretical maximum quasi-rent per employee:
The equation can be restated as a function of value-added per worker in the same form as equation (4) Finally, for comparison with the other models, we note that the maximized value of total quasi-rents in the labor demand model is given by:
The equation (8) for the maximized quasi-rent is only true when all employment demand equations are determined according to equation (6). 5 We have not described the form of the various models when the different skill groups are managed according to different principles within the same firm.
As is well-known, the maximized total quasi-rent from the efficient contract, equation (1), is greater than the total quasi-rent from the labor demand model except when all γ * jt 31's are zero. In contrast with the efficient contract model, both the labor demands equations (6) and the total quasi-rent (8) depend upon the parameters γ * jt 32. In addition, since we have not specified the bargaining game, the quasi-rent splitting parameters may depend upon both employment and total quasi-rents.
The Incentive Compensation Model (IC)
In the basic incentive compensation model there are two possible effort levels for each group:
effort level H j 33, which is the high effort level, and N j 34, which is the normal effort level. The utility given by normal effort corresponds to the utility level on the external market. The choice of effort level is made by the firm subject to the usual feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints.
Our model is a simple version of Holmström and Milgrom (1990) among many others. To put the model in our notation, let γ jt 35 represent the sensitivity of salaries to the output per employee:
which can be restated as: 
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A is lower triangular. Since we have ordered the skill groups from highest (j=1) to lowest (j=J), the form of A means that the effort choice by the highest skill group can affect the marginal productivity of all the groups below, and so on down the hierarchical structure. In addition, the quadratic term in the revenue function, Θ 48, is not a function of the employees' effort levels.
The feasibility constraints for effort levels H j 49 and N j 50, respectively, are:
We assume that the feasibility constraint for effort level H j 53, which generates a disutility of H j 54, does not bind. On the other hand, the feasibility constraint for effort level N j 55, which generates a disutility normalized to zero, binds and is equal to the certainty equivalent of the opportunity cost of time. That is, we assume that the low effort wage rate is the external wage rate. 7 Furthermore, the certainty equivalent of the opportunity cost of time is equal to the external salary itself.
The incentive compatibility constraint for the choice of H j 56 is:
The incentive compatibility constraint is always binding if the feasibility constraint is nonbinding.
The certainty equivalent of the utility of consumption (c) is specialized to:
which is the constant absolute risk aversion case with risk aversion parameter r.
With a binding incentive compatibility constraint we have: 
In particular, this condition implies that the effort decision for one skill group will not depend upon the effort levels chosen for the others.
The interesting case to examine specifically occurs when the firm solves the problem for the high-effort outcome:
subject to equations (12), (13) and (14). Equation (17) determines the profits of the firm when an incentive contract is feasible. The resulting maximized total quasi-rent is: Which regime will determine salaries and employment?
In this section we describe the French institutional setting that constrains the process of wage determination. We model this process as a game in extensive form with at least four different players (employer confederations, union confederations, employers and employees). We show that for the simple version of the game (one category of worker) the choice of salary and employment regimes can be modelled using the maximized total quasi-rent functions from the three cases above.
In 1985 86.4 percent of all employees in establishments with more than 10 employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement ("conventions collectives de branche", see Choffel and Kramarz 1989) . 9 These conventions are negotiated at the national, regional or local level between a confederation of unions and a confederation of employers within a broadly defined industry group.
The convention would normally cover virtually all employment at the establishments represented by the employer confederation. The Minister of Labor may, and often does, extend a convention collective de branche to cover employees in the same industry even if their employers were not members of the confederation. We interpret this arrangement to mean that the branch-level wage rate for all employees may be the relevant external wage for employers in that industry, 10 although it is not the external wage for employees in that industry because they cannot be assured of continued employment within the same sector. In any case, the maximum of the sector-level wage rate, wb 68, and the external wage rate, x, determines the lowest possible wage rate when an establishment is covered by a convention collective de branche. In addition, the national economy has a minimum wage rate, called the SMIC ("salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance"). This minimum wage is revised often and virtually all jobs covered by conventions de branche are paid according to a scale that is indexed by the SMIC. Because this indexation is absolute, not relative, the skill premia in French industries have fallen sharply in the 1980s (Choffel and Kramarz, p. 139) . Furthermore, during the period we use in our data analysis, the average worker (ouvrier, qualifié or nonqualifié) earned between 33 percent (in 1978) and 15 percent (in 1987) more than the SMIC. We interpret these facts to mean that the external wage rate for an employee is strongly related to the level of the SMIC.
In addition to the conventions de branche a large and increasing number of firms negotiate with their employees, whether or not they are represented by one or more unions (syndicats), individual agreements (accords d'entreprise) covering only the employees at their establishments. This process, formalized by the Lois Auroux (passed in 1982), accelerated in the late 1980s; however, many of these accords ratified practices that were already in place at the beginning of the decade. An important feature of the accords d'entreprise is that they are voluntary agreements and, therefore, must depend upon a gain to trade that is specific to the enterprise and its workforce.
These elements suggest the following extensive form game illustrated in Figure 1 . First, a bargaining game is played between confederations of employers and employees that sets wage rates for all employers in the sector, wb 69. This negotiated wage rate cannot depend upon firm-specific information, although it may depend upon sector-level profitability. The resulting bargaining power, γ * jt 70, for the employees, therefore, is predetermined at the sector-level and may depend on the distribution of enterprise total quasi-rents within the sector as well as other factors external to the firm.
At the firm level, the compensation system must respect the convention de branche; however, there are two possibilities for an enterprise accord in which the resulting wage rates are greater than those in the convention. In the first case, the employees have bargaining power γ 0 jt 71 greater than γ * jt 72, which means that on their own they could negotiate a wage rate superior to the convention.
In this case we model the negotiation as a strong form efficient contract. On the other hand, the employer may be able to induce greater productivity using a γ To state the choice problem precisely, in order to supplant the convention de branche with a different system the firm must benefit (it makes the first offer) and the employees must be at least as well off as under the convention. For the case of a single skill group, we can summarize the firm, employee and total payoffs as follows:
Thus, in order for both parties to prefer the efficient contract over the labor demand model the following condition must hold:
However, for condition (20) To determine when incentive contracting will dominate labor demand, we use the solution to the maximized total quasi-rents in the two cases assuming the same quadratic functional form (equation 11) for revenue and continuing to maintain the single factor assumption. In the labor demand case the employer's part of the value function specializes to:
While in the incentive case it becomes:
where the functions y(H) and y(N), defined in conjunction with equation (15) above, have been specialized to the case of one skill group. For IC to be preferred to LD equation (22) must be greater than equation (21). When this is true, the employees will automatically be better off because the feasibility constraint (13a) is nonbinding.
Data sources and methods
In this section we describe the basic French microdata sources. Because of the French reliance on data reported by employers (in contrast to the much more intensive American use of data reported by individuals or unions) and because the basic surveys are exhaustive rather than probability samples, we have used enterprise level information from four different sources without significant loss of representation when the individual surveys were merged. In this section we describe the data and our methods.
BIC-EAE Basic financial information on French enterprises is collected in the form of balance sheets, income statements and flow of funds statements. In contrast to generally accepted accounting practices in the United States and within the European Community, the French enterprise data are collected using an accounting system that is very similar to national income and product accounts. Balance sheet items are recorded at historical cost; however, income statement items are recorded at actual prices during the fiscal year. Thus, for example, total salaries paid, taxes and material costs are all available at the enterprise level. In addition, many accounting results that are not reported at an enterprise level in traditional accounting data are available--for example, the proportion of sales revenue due to exports and the total cost of employment --salaries, benefits and "cotisation" (payroll taxes) are included.
The first of the sources is the BIC "Bénéfices industriels et commerciaux" [Industrial and commercial business income] (see INSEE, 1983) , which is a complete set of financial statistics for the enterprise. The second of these sources is the EAE "Enquête annuelle d'entreprise" [Annual survey of enterprises] (see INSEE, 1983) , which is a detailed annual survey of tax payments, employment, investments and business structure. The EAE also includes some establishment level data for each establishment in the enterprise. Enterprises are linked using their SIREN "Système informatique pour le répertoire des entreprises" [Enterprise identification number] and establishments are linked using their SIRET [Establishment identification number] through SIRENE "Système informatique pour le répertoire des entreprises et des établissements". The SIRET numbers of the establishments of a given enterprise can all be related to the SIREN number of the enterprise.
To facilitate statistical analyses researchers at INSEE have constructed a sample of enterprises from the BIC-EAE. The basic sampling plan is described in a series of technical memos (see, in particular INSEE 1989 (see, in particular INSEE , 1990a enterprises that existed for all ten years (l'échantillon cylindré) and an additional 3,500 enterprises that existed for some part of that period (l'échantillon complémentaire). Detailed cross-year consistency checks and data editing were performed on the panel sample.
Either the basic enterprise sample or the panel enterprise sample can be used with data from the BIC or the EAE through the use of a control file of cross-year identifiers that relate the enterprise/year combinations in the sample to the SIREN identifiers used on the basic surveys. To facilitate use of the BIC and EAE data, INSEE has constructed extracts from these surveys. The BIC extract, which consists of about 250 data items, is described in INSEE 1990c and the EAE extract, which consists of 620 data items, is described in INSEE 1990b. The concordance problems between data items drawn from different forms of the constituent surveys are partially resolved in the supporting documents.
ESE The second source of enterprise level data is the ESE "Enquête sur la structure des emplois" [Survey of the structure of employment] (INSEE 1987) , which is an annual census (except 1982) of employment at establishments larger than 10 employees (15 employees in agriculture) that includes information on the industry of the establishment and the number of workers in each occupation in its workforce by sex. This survey includes very detailed occupational information at the establishment level that we aggregated to the enterprise level using the SIREN.
We aggregated the basic 350 occupations, job descriptions using the Professions et Catégories Socio-professionnelles (PCS) nomenclature, into three categories: ingénieurs, cadres and techniciens (CET, below); ouvriers and employés qualifiés (skilled, below); and ouvriers and employés non-qualifiés (unskilled, below).
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A major change in the occupational coding scheme occurred in 1984, which would have limited comparability with earlier years. To correct for this change we used a detailed bridge developed at INSEE to reclassify the old CS codes (PCS at the 2-digit level) into the new ones (see Seys (1986) ). Moreover, as differences remained because of the change in concepts, the ratio obtained by dividing the structure by skill-level in 1984 by the one in 1983 was applied to the previous years (1978 to 1981) . For 1982 (all enterprises) and any other years with missing occupational structure data (selected enterprises), we interpolated or extrapolated as necessary. We used the net salary, after deductions for government-mandated health insurance, retirement plans, unemployment insurance, and miscellaneous other programs (cotisation salariale) for individuals classified into the same three occupational groups described above based on the PCS at the 2-digit level. Only full time, full year employees were used. We calculated the average full time, full year salary by skill level for each enterprise in the echantillon d'entreprises using all available employees for all available years. For the missing years (1981 and 1983) and, in general, when an average salary for one or more skill groups was missing for a particular enterprise, we interpolated the value using previous years, future years and sectorial averages at the forty industry group level.
DAS-DADS
In all cases the average salaries by skill group were inflated or deflated to make the overall average salary estimated from the DAS by enterprise equal to the average reported by the enterprises in the BIC-EAE.
ESS To estimate the external salary and to determine the coverage by conventions collectives and accord d'entreprise, we used the "Enquête sur la structure des salaires" [Salary structure survey]
for (see INSEE 1990 . This survey of 16,000 establishments (large establishments oversampled) and 600,000 employees contains information on the pay structure and qualifications of all employees employed during the month of October. The employer data includes coverage by conventions collectives, coverage by accords d'entreprise and enterprise identifiers (SIREN). For 56 percent of the echantillon d'entreprises firms we can establish the existence/nonexistence of an accord d'entreprise. These firms are larger on average than the typical enterprise in the echantillon d'entreprises. In all cases, when we analyzed firms conditional on their collectively negotiated pay systems, we assumed that the status in 1986 (from the ESS) was true in all years of the estimation period .
To compute the external salary we combined data from the ESS with the national SMIC. We estimated the relationship between the log of full time salary in October 1986 (for full month workers only) and the employee's age, qualification professionnelle, 12 département (where employed) and sex.
We computed the predicted value from this regression for each of the 575,000 employees. Using the three skill groups described above and the industry at the 4-digit level (APE niveau 600), we computed the average predicted log salary for each skill group within each detailed industry. The tenth percentile was selected as the base index (value=1.00 in 1986). All remaining groups were rescaled as a ratio to this base group. The external salary was defined as the SMIC (monthly, net of cotisation salariale) times the appropriate skill group index for the detailed industry. The external salaries were merged into the exhantillon d'entreprises by 4-digit industry.
Analysis Sample All data were merged into the basic echantillon d'entreprises. From this sample we selected manufacturing firms with complete data from 1978 to 1987 who had employees in each of the three skill groups. Our analysis sample consisted of 1,097 enterprises, each of which had 10 years of data. The summary distribution by industry and other statistics are shown in Table 1 .
Many of our analyses were conducted using only the firms with accord d'entreprise versus those known not to have such an accord. There were 273 firms with accords and 338 firms without.
Summary statistics for these firms are also shown in Table 1 .
Estimation results
We begin by characterizing the firms with enterprise accords as compared to those without accords. Table 2 shows these comparisons as regression-adjusted differences in the mean values of a variety of size, production, pay and profitability indicators. Firms with accords are larger, have large total quasi-rents, and are more profitable for both employers and employees. These statements are also true on a per worker basis.
Since we have no reason to expect efficient contracting and every reason to expect incentive contracting in the case of enterprise accords, these results indicate that the data, adjusted for sector and year, could well be consistent with such a pay system. In particular, the portion of the real quasi-rent per worker that accrues to the employees is 4,200 F (1980) for firms with enterprise accords (significantly different from the reference group--accord status unknown). For firms without such agreements, the proportion of the real quasi-rent going to the workers in only 600 F (1980), which is not significantly different from the reference group.
We next examine differences in the labor demand equations for firms with and without enterprise accords. Table 3 shows a conventional log linear labor demand system estimated for all workers (columns labelled All) and for each skill group separately. Table 4 shows the same demand systems estimated using the external wage rate in place of the actual wage rate. Tables 5 and 6 show the log linear labor demand systems restricting the wage and capital price coefficients to be equal and opposite. Tables 5 and 6 use internal and external wage rates, respectively. All four tables were estimated for the years 1982 to 1987 using instrumental variable methods with employment levels, actual salaries, and real production endogenous. The external salaries and the price of capital are exogenous. All equations include indicators for the year and industry (NAP level 40, roughly 2-digit SIC) and were estimated with instrumental variables.
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Clearly the labor demand systems using the internal wage rates provide a better statistical and economic summary of the data, particularly for the firms with enterprise accords but also for those without accord. First, it is important to note that the systems estimated for the firms with accords and with aggregate employment levels (columns All in four tables) are the only estimated equations that are directly comparable to American, Canadian and British studies that have attempted to model employment demand in a variety of contracting regimes. For this case, the labor demand equations (unrestricted or unrestricted) are very similar whether we use internal or external wage rates. In the unrestricted case, the estimated substitution effects are much larger than one usually expects (the implied elasticity of substitution is around 5). The demand equations for all employees in firms without accords also have large estimated elasticities, which are nevertheless more reasonable, however, the capital price coefficient has the wrong sign in this unrestricted case.
The disaggregated labor demand equations are uniformly more reasonable when we use the internal salary (compare the unrestricted estimates of Table 3 with Table 4 and the restricted estimates of Table 5 with Table 6 ). Implied elasticities of substitution increase going from CET to unskilled workers. In the unrestricted estimates, the capital price elasticities have the correct sign for firms with accords (although the elasticity is rather large in the unskilled equation). For firms without accords the Table 3 results show very reasonable own-wage elasticities but the capital price elasticities are negative. However, the restricted estimates in Table 5 are not significantly different from the unrestricted estimates in Table 3 . Thus we conclude that the restricted labor demand system using internal wage rates is an acceptable statistical description of the disaggregated employment decisions of the firms as compared with the unrestricted system using internal wages and any of the systems using external wages. Table 7 estimates the average relation between the log internal salary, the log external salary and the log real value-added per worker. 14 Because of the logarithmic specification the coefficient on log real value-added per worker is an underestimate of γ 85, the coefficient on the log real external salary (which is the average external salary of all skill groups) is an overestimate of γ -86, and the coefficient on log own external salary should be less than unity. 15 On average, the employees receive 29 percent of the quasi-rents-per-employee (see Table 1 ). The estimates in Table 7 for All workers are 25 percent (with accord) and 39 percent (without accord), respectively. The logarithmic form of the wage determination equation, therefore, is a reasonable specification for the aggregate wage rate in firms with accords but over-estimates worker's share in the nonaccord case. When we disaggregate by skill group, the equation works well for unskilled workers and reasonably well for skilled workers. However, it is clear that CET salaries are determined without much reference to what we have estimated as the external salary. Since an important component of the external salary we used is the SMIC, we believe that this result shows that the SMIC is highly correlated with the changes in external wage rates for unskilled and (probably) for skilled workers but is largely unrelated to the temporal movements in the external wage of CET employees. Table 8 is a direct test of the incentive compensation model when the incentive compatibility constraint (15) is binding. The table shows the relation between the inverse γ's and the proportion of workers in each skill group (using the same instruments as in the preceding tables). The coefficients on the proportions represent the incremental productivity from an incentive contract (relative to the disutility of effort) compared to the normal effort level. Therefore, they should be positive. In addition, if the hypothesized structure of the matrix A is correct, in the CET equation the CET coefficient will be larger than the other two; similarly, in the skilled equation the skilled coefficient will be larger than the unskilled. Recall that these coefficients correspond to the effect of one group's effort level on the marginal productivity of the other groups. In the firms with accords, the estimated coefficients confirm all these hypotheses. In the firms without accords, the off-diagonal elements of A are all negative or zero and the relative magnitudes of the coefficients are lower than the estimates for firms with accords. The incentive contracting model, therefore, is clearly consistent in the case where firms and workers sign an explicit accord. However, in the nonaccord case the evidence for the incentive contracting is mixed.
Conclusion
We have considered the problem of wage and employment determination at the firm level using a model that allows for heterogeneity of the workers (in skill groups and according to their external opportunities) and of the firms (choice of contracting regime). As applied to the institutional setting in France, one regime--efficient contracting--appears to be theoretically dominated by either labor demand or incentive compensation systems. This somewhat unusual result (from an American viewpoint, but not from a European one) stems from sector-level bargaining that precedes a firm's wage and employment decisions. Sector-level bargaining appears to preclude the use of a lower firm wage and a higher firm employment level as a means of achieving an efficient contract. Thus, French firms must find a productivity advantage from salary systems that offer more than the sector-level wage rates.
In our empirical analysis the firm level heterogeneity is measured using accords d'entreprise as an indicator of different wage/employment determination regimes. We find that a restricted system of disaggregated static labor demand equations using internal wage rates adequately describes the employment outcomes in both regimes. Using external wage rates in the labor demand equations, particularly in the disaggregated case, yields employment equations that are not as well-determined and often wrong-signed. In contrast, our results for the aggregate of all employees show that either the internal or external wage rate can be used in the labor demand equation without much difference in the estimated elasticities. Furthermore, the differences in the structure of salary determination between firms with and without accords are not particularly striking for the aggregate employment models. Finally, our direct test of the incentive compensation model also yields evidence that firms with accords benefit from a productivity gain related to the structure of their compensation systems.
Thus, both dimensions of heterogeneity (workers and firms) are important in our statistical tests of the competing models.
Our paper leaves unresolved several potentially important questions. First, we have not derived a specific form for the disaggregated employment decisions in the incentive contracting model. Thus, it is difficult to contrast incentive contracting with the labor demand model. Second, we have not modelled the choice of contracting regime when the firm is allowed to use several systems at the same time (e.g. incentives for some, labor demand for others). Third, we have not used any dynamics in our models. In a dynamic framework, it is possible that the dominance of labor demand and incentive contracts with respect to efficient contracts disappears. Moreover, we expect the quality of the labor demand equations and our ability to differentiate regimes will improve when we allow for explicit dynamics.
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We have written all models as one-period static decision problems. Equivalent models exist in present value form en there are no capital costs associated with changes in the employment levels. Our solutions, however, ignore real amics (e.g. adjustment costs).
In an efficient contract the resulting wealth of the union is L ) x -w ( See Holmström and Milgrom (1987) for a justification of the restriction to linear compensation functions.
Without loss of generality the slope coefficient, γ, in the low effort state has been set equal to zero. That is, the wage d in the low effort state is the external wage rate and does not, therefore, depend upon the performance of the firm.
nce, the choice of an effort level N by the firm is equivalent to choosing one of the other two contracting possibilities.
In the special case of a single skill group it can be shown that the union's wealth is γ The figure is 92.5 percent for manufacturing industries, which are the only ones used in our empirical models. Only percent of manufacturing workers are not covered by either a convention collective de branche or an enterprise level eement.
We presume that the negotiated wage rate is greater than the external wage.
All females in PCS categories corresponding to blue collar occupations (ouvriers qualifiés) were grouped with the -skilled occupations (ouvriers non-qualifiés) because on average the level of employer-reported qualification for these men substantially exceeds their self-reports (Cezard 1979 ).
This variable is created from classifications within conventions collectives at seven broad levels (ouvriers, employés, nts de maîtrise, techniciens, ingénieurs et cadres, apprentis, and jeunes en formation) which correspond to different egories used in French social legislation. Within each of these classifications the level of qualification was given on a e of 1 to 7. The interaction contains 19 distinct qualification levels which, although not exactly education and specialty, the closest we could get to data on schooling.
The estimates are sensitive to the choice of instruments. In particular, the results are very different if lagged ogenous variables are included in levels, rather than as differences. We interpret this to mean that there is a strong sibility that the error terms in the demand systems include a firm-specific effect. The estimates in Tables 3 to 8 are sistent in this case (because all variables that might include the firm-specific effect enter as differences in the instrument . We cannot estimate the equation system in first differences because all of the temporal variability in the external wage es comes from the SMIC and not from changes in the underlying skill composition of the three employee groups. This blem occurs because only one year of the ESS was available for estimating the external wage rate.
See Abowd and Lemieux (1991) for a discussion of the logarithmic approximation of the wage settlement function.
For the equations in the All column, the coefficient on log real value added per worker is an under-estimate of γ, while coefficient on log real external salary is an over-estimate of 1-γ. .2) 43.5 (9.3) 43.0 (9.1) Nonskilled workers 35.6 (13.0) 36.0 (7.7) 35.6 (7.6) Real production (mill. 
2.
The instrumental variables were: log real external salaries (CET, skilled, unskilled) contemporaneous and two lags; log real external salary (enterprise average, differenced, lags 2 and 3); log real internal salaries (average, CET, skilled, unskilled, differenced, lags 2 and 3); log real production (differenced, lags 2 and 3); value-added as a percent of production (differenced, lags 1, 2 and 3); exports as a percentage of sales (differenced, lags 1, 2 and 3); log total employment (differenced, lags 2 and 3); log real capital stock (differenced, lags 2 and 3); log real value-added (differenced, lags 2 and 3); log price of capital (contemporaneous, lags 1, 2 and 3); industry indicators (19); year indicators (5). 
The instrumental variables were: log real external salaries (CET, skilled, unskilled) contemporaneous and two lags; log real external salary (enterprise average, differenced, lags 2 and 3); log real internal salaries (average, CET, skilled, unskilled, differenced, lags 2 and 3); log real production (differenced, lags 2 and 3); value-added as a percent of production (differenced, lags 1, 2 and 3); exports as a percentage of sales (differenced, lags 1, 2 and 3); log total employment (differenced, lags 2 and 3); log real capital stock (differenced, lags 2 and 3); log real value-added (differenced, lags 2 and 3); log price of capital (contemporaneous, lags 1, 2 and 3); industry indicators (19); year indicators (5).
Sources: INSEE: Echantillon d'entreprises, BIC-EAE, ESE, ESS, DAS-DADS. 
Sources: INSEE: Echantillon d'entreprises, BIC-EAE, ESE, ESS, DAS-DADS. Notes:
1. The sample size for the With Accord group is 1,638 and each equation has 1,610 error degrees of freedom (except the column All, which has 1,611). The sample size for the Without Accord group is 2,028 and each equation has 2,000 error degrees of freedom (except the column All, which has 2,001). All equations contain an intercept, year indicators (1983 to 1987) and industry indicators (APE niveau 40, approx. 2-digit SIC). The equations are estimated for the years 1982 to 1987.
